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Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten. ... Read more

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`What a brilliant idea! To provide readers with both information on the Nobel Laureates in Economics and, to the degree possible, the original papers for which they were honored. The names of the "contributing" Laureates speak for themselves. Howard Vane and Chris Mulhearn, the editors, and Edward Elgar, the publisher, are to be congratulated for putting the idea into effect.'
- Warren J. Samuels, Michigan State University, US

`These volumes complement Vane and Mulhearn's critically acclaimed book, The Nobel Memorial Laureates in Economics, and are an indispensable guide to key developments in modern economics.'
- Mark Blaug, Universities of London and Buckingham, UK

`The nature, content and boundaries of economics are changing. There is no better way of examining the key contributions that have shaped the discipline in the last half century than by looking at the pioneering works of the Nobel Laureates in Economics. These volumes not only provide a treasure house of material of high intrinsic worth, but also help us to understand what kind of approaches and ideas have been successful in persuading other economists, and thereby provide valuable material for understanding the evolution of the discipline. The idea behind this series of volumes is brilliant.'
- Geoffrey M. Hodgson, University of Hertfordshire Business School, UK ... Read more

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How do people behave in different traffic situations? Are there general laws for mathematical modelling of decision dynamics? The answers, given at the first international workshop on "Human Behaviour in Traffic Networks", are presented in this volume. In 13 articles, well-known experts report about their current work on experiments and modelling in this area. The topics range from psychological behaviour in traffic situations, traffic simulations of various aspects and market analysis to experiments with human participants used in experimental economics. The articles filled with many illustrations are aimed at interested students as well as experts in this field.

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Reinhard Selten, to date the only German Nobel Prize laureate in economics, celebrates his 80th birthday in 2010. While his contributions to game theory are well-known, the behavioral side of his scientific work has received less public exposure, even though he has been committed to experimental research during his entire career, publishing more experimental than theoretical papers in top-tier journals. This Festschrift is dedicated to Reinhard Selten’s exceptional influence on behavioral and experimental economics. In this collection of academic highlight papers, a number of his students are joined by leading scholars in experimental research to document the historical role of the “Meister” in the development of the research methodology and of several sub-fields of behavioral economics. Next to the academic insight in these highly active fields of experimental research, the papers also provide a glance at Reinhard Selten’s academic and personal interaction with his students and peers. ... Read more

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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed. ... Read more

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In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory.Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analyzing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.

This outstanding two-volume selection of Selten's work provides a comprehensive overview of his contribution to game theory and economic behavior.Topics covered include:

- axiomatic characterizations
- learning
- political and social interaction
- theories of oligopolistic competition
- oligopoly experiments
- bilateral and coalition bargaining

The volumes also contain a foreword by Alvin Roth, a detailed introduction to Selten's work by Andreas Ortmann and a full bibliography of Selten's publications. ... Read more

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The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenmüller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions of non-cooperative game theory are discussed in three essays by Güth, Hardin, and Sugden in Part III. Applied game models are discussed in three papers by Friedman, Selten, and Shubik in Part IV. Problems of social choice are investigated in Part V which deals with utilitarianism and related topics in five contributions by Hammond, Binmore, Arrow, Roemer, and Broome. Finally, Part VI contains three papers: an interdisciplinary comparison of physics and economics by Samuelson, a methodological essay by Brock, and an appraisal of the work of John C. Harsanyi. ... Read more

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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume II Methods, Morals and Markets contains areas of research which will attract the interest of economists, political scientists, mathematicians and philosophers. The papers deal with the methodology of analysis of games, game theoretic contributions to fundamental ethical questions facing societies and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. ... Read more

Product Description
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interes for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume I Evolution and Game Dynamics mainly deals with dynamic stability with respect to evolutionary processes. The book offers not only theoretical classification of the foundations of evolutionary game theory, but also exciting new biological applications. Volume II Methods, Morals and Markets contains areas of research which will attract the interest of economists, political scientists, mathematicians and philosophers. The papers deal with the methodology of analysis of games, game theoretic contributions to fundamental ethical questions facing societies and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed. ... Read more

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In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning.This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people’s reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

Cavil about the Editorial Review
It was not "about forty years ago" that Herbert Simon used "satisficing" and "bounded rationality" to discuss human decision making. He used these terms in 1947 in his book, Administrative Behavior. That's more than 60 years ago.

Human Rationality and Evolution
This edited volume is an important addition to the work on human decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, in which people use "rules of thumb" to produce cost-effective decisions that are not strictly "rational." From the psychological literature, the work of Kahneman and Tversky is well know (and has been rewarded with international recognition). However, they do not explicitly link such behavior (often referred to as "heuristics") to evolution and biology.And they tend to define these "rules of thumb" as rather poor guides to decision making.

The essays in this edited volume provide a different--and more optimistic picture--of such heuristics.The contributors provide evidence and logic to suggest that evolution has led to the development of decision making shortcuts that "work" reasonably well.

One can disagree with certain aspects of this work (they may be a bit harsh on Kahneman and Tversky and their peers; they may be overly optimistic about some of the heuristics that they mention).Nonetheless, this work is a wonderful introduction to a literature on how humans actually think and decide--rather than relying on abstract conceptualizations often prevalent in the social sciences, including the simplistic "rational choice" theory ascendant in several social science disciplines.This book represents a welcome corrective to such perspectives.

State of the Art on Behavioral Choice Theory
Suppose we wanted to predict how an expert billiards player would hit a certain shot. We would measure the angles and distances, get the coefficients of elasticity of the balls and the bumpers, and we would solve a set of differential equations. But is that how the billiards player figures out what to do? Of course not! We don't know exactly what he would do, but if the authors of this book had their way, we'd give up on the differential equations (optimization theory) and find the "fast and frugal heuristic" actually used by the billiards player.

This book is the product of a conference of experts in the field. It includes wonderful contributions by the editors and their coworkers on how decisions are actually made, and argues persuasively that fast and frugal is almost as good as full optimization, and at much lower cost.

But the volume is a lot broader than that. It includes contributions on the role of emotions in decision-making (Dan Fessler), learning in animal societies (Keven Laland) and social insects (Thomas Seeley), and a lot of material on the role of culture in human societies (Boyd, Richerson, McCabe, Smith, Henrich, and others). This is important new material, very up to date.

Gigerenzter and Selten go to great lengths to cast aspersions on the old-fashioned "optimization subject to constraints" perspective, but their arguments are not persuasive. They make a category error: they maintain that models that use optimization assume that the agents the models describe use optimization. This is just silly. Just as the billiards player does not solve differential equations, decision-makers do not do complete optimization, even though we may use such models to describe their behavior.

The editors believe that optimization subject to constraints is dead in behavioral theory, but they're dead wrong. That's in fact what they are doing, but they prefer to call it "bounded rationality."

Finally, I should note that the work of Eduardo Zambrano (look up his home page) shows that the SEU (Subjective Expected Utility model---the enemy of all bounded rationalers) actually is behaviorally universal, in the sense that one can always find a set of Bayesian priors for which an observed set of behaviors is optimal.

But don't let these petty methodological issues get you down. The book is a great collection by the authors of major work in behavioral theory. ... Read more

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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed. ... Read more

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Aus Wikipedia. Nicht dargestellt. Auszug: Karl Barth (May 10, 1886) - December 10, 1968) (pronounced "Bart") was a Swiss Reformed theologian whom critics hold to be among the most important Christian thinkers of the 20th century; Pope Pius XII described him as the most important theologian since Thomas Aquinas. Beginning with his experience as a pastor, he rejected his training in the predominant liberal theology typical of 19th-century European Protestantism. Instead he embarked on a new theological path initially called dialectical theology, due to its stress on the paradoxical nature of divine truth (e.g., God's relationship to humanity embodies both grace and judgment). Other critics have referred to Barth as the father of neo-orthodoxy - a term emphatically rejected by Barth himself. The most accurate description of his work might be "a theology of the Word." Barth's theological thought emphasized the sovereignty of God, particularly through his innovative doctrine of election. Born in Basel, Barth spent his childhood years in Bern. From 1911 to 1921 he served as a Reformed pastor in the village of Safenwil in the canton Aargau. In 1913 he married Nelly Hoffmann, a talented violinist. They had four sons and a daughter. Later he was professor of theology in Göttingen (1921-1925), Münster (1925-1930) and Bonn (1930-1935) (Germany). While serving at Göttingen he met Charlotte von Kirschbaum, who became his long-time secretary and assistant; she played a large role in the writing of his epic the Church Dogmatics. He had to leave Germany in 1935 after he refused to swear allegiance to Adolf Hitler. Barth went back to Switzerland and became professor in Basel (1935-1962). Barth was originally trained in German Protestant Liberalism under such teachers as Wilhelm Herrmann, but reacted against this theology at the time of the First World War. His reaction was fed by several factors, including his commitment to the German and Swiss...http://booksllc.net/?l=de ... Read more

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Kapitel: Reinhard Selten, Norbert Röttgen, Gerd Langguth, Diether Deneke, Carlo Mense, Wolfgang Müller Von Königswinter, Karl Spindler, Ernst Heinrich Von Dechen, Klaus Borchard, Caesarius Von Heisterbach, Ernemann Sander, Ottmar E. Strauß, Gottfried Von Drachenfels, Peter Buchholz, Florina Gillnik, Ferdinand Mülhens, Franz Ittenbach, Burkhard Mohr, Paul Lemmerz, Johann Lemmerz, August Mirbach. Aus Wikipedia. Nicht dargestellt. Auszug: Caesar of Heisterbach, also known as Caesarius of Heisterbach ca. 1180 - ca. 1240, was the prior of the former Cistercian Heisterbach Abbey, in the Siebengebirge near the little town of Oberdollendorf, Germany. He is best known as the compiler of a book of hagiography that contains many wondrous tales of miracles in the form of dialogues between a monk and a novice, the Dialogus magnus visionum ac miraculorum, which is a consistently readable and entertaining, if somewhat sensationalistic and credulous, compilation of that lore. The work was often referred to by preachers seeking material for sermons in the Late Middle Ages. The work was popular and was widely distributed, showing that it catered well to the tastes of the times; it was perhaps the second largest late mediaeval best-seller, second only to the Golden Legend of Jacobus de Voragine. A vision reported in the book provided the source for the iconography of the Virgin of Mercy. Caesar of Heisterbach is also remembered for a maxim on the rise and fall of monasteries; he wrote that discipline causes prosperity in a monastery, and prosperity undermines discipline. He also gave the name of Titivillus as the demon who allegedly caused typographical errors in the work of scribes. Though the priory was dissolved in 1803, when the library and archives were given to the city of Düsseldorf, and the monastery and the church were sold and torn down in 1809, and though at present only the ruinous apse with the ruins of the choir remains, a monument ...http://booksllc.net/?l=de ... Read more

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Purchase includes free access to book updates online and a free trial membership in the publisher's book club where you can select from more than a million books without charge. Chapters: Wilhelm Ostwald, Silvio Gesell, Detlev Blanke, Ino Kolbe, Reinhard Selten, Eckhard Bick, Ulrich Becker, Hermann Häfker, Ludwig Renn, Hans Jakob, Helmar Frank, Emanuel Reicher, Johannes Waldemar Karsch. Excerpt:Detlev Blanke Detlev Blanke (born May 30, 1941) is an interlinguistics lecturer at Humboldt University of Berlin . He is one of Germany's most active Esperanto philologists and has been since 1991 both the chair of the Gesellschaft für Interlinguistik ("Interlinguistics Society") and the editor of its newsletter, Interlinguistische Informationen . He and his wife Wera Blanke are especially interested in the evolution of language particularly in the development of terminology for the planned language Esperanto and in questions of sociolinguistics . Blanke has made a keen study of Eugen Wüster's work towards common international terminology and towards international standardization. Academic career After completing his initial university studies he worked as a teacher of German and geography . He earned a doctorate from Humboldt University of Berlin in 1976 with his dissertation on comparative word construction of Esperanto and German. In 1985 he earned a second doctorate from Humboldt on constructed languages . (In the former East Germany such a second degree was known as "dissertation B", corresponding to the highest academic qualification of "habilitation " awarded to full professors in many European countries.) In 1988 the university appointed him "Honorary Lecturer of Interlinguistics." Esperanto activities Having first taught himself Esperanto in 1957, he later became secretary (1968 through 1990) of the Centra Laborrondo de Esperanto-Amikoj ("Central Workers' Circle of Friends of Esperanto"), a government-sanctioned affiliate of East Germany 's Cultural Association ... ... Read more

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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume II Methods, Morals and Markets contains areas of research which will attract the interest of economists, political scientists, mathematicians and philosophers. The papers deal with the methodology of analysis of games, game theoretic contributions to fundamental ethical questions facing societies and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. ... Read more

Product Description
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored. ... Read more

Product Description
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interes for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume I Evolution and Game Dynamics mainly deals with dynamic stability with respect to evolutionary processes. The book offers not only theoretical classification of the foundations of evolutionary game theory, but also exciting new biological applications. Volume II Methods, Morals and Markets contains areas of research which will attract the interest of economists, political scientists, mathematicians and philosophers. The papers deal with the methodology of analysis of games, game theoretic contributions to fundamental ethical questions facing societies and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed. ... Read more

Product Description
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored. ... Read more